# 2026-03-27 Auth Session Hardening Remediation

## Scope

- Q-001 session hardening
- Q-002 OAuth return_to trust-boundary hardening
- Q-003 security-sensitive random fail-close hardening
- real-browser E2E closure after the auth/session model change

## Implemented Remediation

- Backend refresh continuity now uses a backend-managed `HttpOnly` refresh cookie.
- Frontend access token, current user, and current roles are memory-only; they are no longer persisted into `localStorage` or `sessionStorage`.
- Backend now also sets a non-sensitive session-presence cookie (`ums_session_present`) so the frontend can distinguish:
  - "there may be a server session worth restoring"
  - "there is clearly no session, so do not probe `/auth/refresh`"
- Frontend `AuthProvider` now:
  - skips restore probing when the session-presence cookie is absent
  - keeps restore probing available when the cookie exists, including page reload on protected pages
  - stops performing its own redirect on restore failure and lets `RequireAuth` preserve the original `from` route
  - exports effective auth state from the in-memory session store to avoid post-login route races
- OAuth `return_to` no longer trusts request-derived forwarded origin inference and is restricted to:
  - absolute frontend paths
  - explicitly allowlisted origins
- `crypto/rand` failure no longer silently degrades into weaker random generation for JWT JTI, email code, or captcha identifiers.

## Validation

Validated on 2026-03-27 with:

```powershell
go test ./... -count=1
go vet ./...
go build ./cmd/server

cd D:\project\frontend\admin
npm.cmd run test:run
npm.cmd run lint
npm.cmd run build
powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .\scripts\run-playwright-auth-e2e.ps1
```

## Latest Real Result

- Backend gates: passed
- Frontend gates: passed
- Real browser CDP E2E: passed
- Verified E2E scenarios:
  - `admin-bootstrap`
  - `public-registration`
  - `email-activation`
  - `login-surface`
  - `auth-workflow`
  - `responsive-login`
  - `desktop-mobile-navigation`

## Real Outcome

- Q-001 is no longer a current open high-risk issue in the project's implemented session model.
- Q-002 is no longer a current open high-risk issue in the OAuth frontend return path trust boundary.
- Q-003 is no longer a current open medium-risk issue in security-sensitive randomness handling.
- This remediation also closed a real regression introduced during the session hardening pass:
  - public or unauthenticated route loads no longer emit browser console `400 Bad Request` noise from blind `/auth/refresh` probing
  - protected-route redirects again preserve the original route intent through `RequireAuth`

## Remaining Real Gaps

- Q-004 automation coverage depth is still insufficient in several low-level/backend modules and key frontend containers.
- Q-005 dev toolchain SCA findings are still not fully cleared.
- Q-006 external alert delivery evidence is still not fully closed.
